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these rights. This approach could require 
states to take positive measures to 
maintain or improve environmental 
quality to meet a standard compatible 
with respect for the right to private life.
The European Court has not yet gone 
so far as to require a state to undertake 
positive obligations. This may be due to 
the sensitivity of the court to the charge 
that it acts as a supranational body, which 
has made it wary of interfering in 
decisions made by states. The UK courts 
will not be under the same restraints and 
may adopt a more robust approach.
There are also indications of a 
willingness by the European Court to 
expand the scope to the right to life. In 
Association X v United Kingdom (application 
7154/75 14EurComnHRD&R, 31, 32 
[1979]), parents whose children had died 
or been severely injured as a result of 
vaccinations claimed that the British 
authorities had unjustifiably jeopardised 
the children's lives by not providing 
information on the risks of vaccination. 
The commission accepted that the state 
was obliged not only to refrain from 
taking life intentionally but also to take 
adequate steps to safeguard it. However,
as the state had not intended the injuries, 
and adequate measures had been taken, 
the complaint was declared to be ill- 
founded.
In Guerra v Italy Walsh J was of the view 
that art. 2 guarantees the protection of 
the bodily integrity of the applicants. 
Jambrek J saw the protection of health 
and physical integrity as being equally 
closely associated with the right to life as 
to the right to respect for private and 
family life. He was prepared to accept 
that the withholding of information 
about environmental risks could come 
within art. 2 and that the court's case law 
on art. 2 should start evolving in this 
respect.
Over time, an expansion of art. 2 may 
have the biggest effect on UK 
environmental law. The right to life could 
be invoked by workers claiming exposure 
to the risk of industrial accidents as a 
result of poor management systems or 
the use of chemicals whose toxicity is 
unknown. Similar principles will apply to 
risks from chronic pollution, as for 
example asthma caused by traffic, or 
exposure to asbestos dust or to 
pesticides.
CONCLUSION
There is certainly scope for the ECHR 
to affect the development of UK 
environmental law particularly with 
respect to creative uses of the right to life 
and the right to family and home life. The 
convention is also likely to perform the 
more nebulous task of keeping 
enforcement authorities on their toes in 
the light of the added weapon in the 
hands of plaintiffs.
Incorporation will not, however, 
resolve a number of underlying issues 
that make environmental litigation 
particularly difficult. These include 
valuing loss to the environment and 
linking the complex scientific 
explanations for pollution to legal 
concepts of causation. ^




Protection from discrimination: the European dimension
by Geoffrey Bindman
The government's intention in the 
Human Rights Act 1998 is to make the 
rights protected by the European Human 
Rights Convention (EHRC) enforceable 
in domestic law. This is to be achieved by 
requiring public authorities to act in 
conformity with those rights and by 
giving the courts the right to determine
o o o
whether or not they have done so. Judges 
must interpret both common law and 
statute law to give effect as far as possible 
to those rights. Only when a statute 
cannot be so interpreted will the courts 
be powerless to implement the 
convention. In that situation their role 
will be limited to making a declaration of 
incompatibility', which it will be for 
Parliament to correct. The domestic 
courts will not be bound by decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights 
but they must take them into account.
The rights to be incorporated are only 
those set out in the convention. 
Surprisingly, these do not include the right 
not to suffer discrimination on racial or 
other arbitrary grounds. The convention 
provides in art. 14 merely as follows:
'The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
setjorth in this convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, birth orj
other status.'
Yutaka Arai, in an article in Amicus 
Curiae November 1998, at p. 6, explained 
how art. 14 has been interpreted by the 
European Court and Commission of 
Human Rights and demonstrated that 
they have given it a broad interpretation 
wherever possible, even to the extent of 
holding that a breach of art. 14 can occur
o
where no violation of a substantive right 
has been proved. Nevertheless the 
absence of a substantive right to be free 
of discrimination in the convention is a 
severe restriction on its effectiveness as a 
safeguard against unfair discrimination.
The limited protection against 
discrimination in the convention reflects 
a general lack of concern about
o
discrimination in Europe as a whole at 
the time when the convention was 
introduced in 1950. Notwithstanding the 
recent terrible experience of the 
Holocaust, politicians failed to recognise 
any role for the law in the protection of 
ethnic minorities. Such groups were 
often perceived in terms of nationality or 
citizenship, and there was a long-standing 
assumption that discrimination on those 
grounds was legitimate and a proper 
exercise of national sovereignty. 25
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Freedom from discrimination on 
grounds such as race, gender, and 
disability has been established as a 
fundamental human right at least since 
1948. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in its first paragraph 
asserts the equal rights of all members of 
the human family. Section 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights   an instrument intended 
to amplify a major part of the declaration 
into an enforceable code   requires its 
signatories:
'to prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any 
around such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.'
The International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1965) and the similar 
convention restraining discrimination 
against women (1979), both ratified by 
the UK, elaborate on these obligations.
Domestic law in the UK gives a high 
level of protection against discrimination 
through the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
(SDA), the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA), 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
(DDA) and the domestic implementation 
of EC law as embodied in art. 119 of the 
Treaty of Rome and a series ol directives.
The Human Rights Act 1998 will be 
essentially a procedural measure which 
will embody in domestic law the rights 
already vested in those living in the UK 
by reason of its adherence to the EHRC. 
However, though in theory it confers no 
new rights, it is likely to have a significant 
impact on the ability and willingness of 
UK residents to assert and even expand 
convention rights in ways which could 
not be achieved through the current 
enforcement machinery available only in 
Strasbourg.
CREATING A CULTURE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS
The intention of the government is 
that a 'culture' of human rights will beo
created. This seems to mean an 
awareness among the public that they 
possess fundamental rights and that they 
can assert them against anyone, especially 
the state and its surrogates. Few lawyers, 
let alone the public at large, are currently 
familiar with the convention and, even in 
the rare cases where the possibility of a
remedy at Strasbourg is considered, the 
practical difficulties and procedural 
delays often rule it out. Eegal aid is 
available from the European Human 
Rights Commission but it is very limited 
and not usually available until an 
advanced stage in the process. The fact 
that convention rights can be claimed in
o
domestic courts will obviously encourage 
reliance on them and, anticipating that 
arguments based on the convention will 
increasingly be relied on, the government 
is embarking on a programme of judicial 
education (at the estimated cost of up to 
£4.5 m).
The act will make it unlawful for a 
public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a convention right. 
The courts and industrial tribunals will be 
treated as public authorities for this 
purpose. This may mean that courts and 
tribunals must consider of their own 
motion convention rights arising in caseso o
before them, whether or not raised by 
the parties. If so, how could such a duty 
be enforced and wrhat are the 
consequences of breach? These are 
among a number of issues the courts will 
themselves have to resolve when the act 
comes into force.
Notwithstanding the 'sitic' status of 
discrimination in the convention, and 
notwithstanding the wide scope of 
domestic anti-discrimination law, 
incorporation will open the way for a 
number of discrimination issues to be 
litigated.
In the first place, the scope of the 
discrimination covered by art. 14 is much 
wider than in domestic law. Domestic law 
restrains discrimination on grounds of 
'colour, race, nationality or ethnic or 
national origins'; on grounds of sex (i.e. 
gender) or marital status; and on the 
ground of disability, but discrimination 
on all other grounds is lawful. Article 14 
covers discrimination on any ground:
'such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth, or other status.'
The words 'such as' will allow the 
courts to treat discrimination on the 
ground of sexual orientation as unlawful 
in suitable circumstances.
Although, as Yutaka Arai has shown, it 
may not be necessary to prove violation 
of a substantive right or freedom 
protected bv the convention, a direct link
with such a right or freedom must be 
shown and that will not be easy. 
Sometimes a blatant case of 
discrimination may, of itself, be a 
violation of art. 3 (prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading treatment). The 
commission itself endorsed this 
possibility in its report on the East African 
Asians case in 1973. Article 4 (prohibition 
of slaverv and forced labour) and art. 6 
(the right to a fair trial) may be relied on 
to support other discrimination claims. 
In cases of race and sex discrimination, 
the effect of the Human Rights Act will 
not be to make new remedies available 
but to supply the impetus to seek those 
which already exist.
IMPACT OF EC LAW
There has already, of course, been a 
considerable impact from European law 
on anti-discrimination law through EC 
law. In relation to sex (or rather gender) 
discrimination, this has largely been the 
product of art. 119 of the Treaty of Rome 
which provides for equal pay for equal 
work as between men and women, and a 
series of directives, covering equal pay, 
equal treatment pregnancy, and social 
security. The directives are enforceable 
only against the government, which,J o o ' '
however, has been obliged to introduce 
legislation to implement them. The 
impact on racial discrimination has been 
only marginal or consequential. The ECJ 
decision in Marshall (Marshall v 
Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area 
Health Authority (Case C-271/91, [1993] 
2 CEC 378) for example, which held that 
the limit in the SDA on the amount of 
compensation awards violated art. 119, 
had an immediate binding effect on UK 
courts but did not apply to racial 
discrimination cases, although the 
statutory provisions in the RRA were 
virtually identical to those of the SDA. In 
practice the anomaly could not survive 
and was removed by Parliament, the 
government accepting a private 
members' bill.
By virtue of the European Communities 
Act 1972, community law and decisions 
of the ECJ are binding on UK courts and 
tribunals. No parallel is proposed for the 
Human Rights Convention and courts 
and tribunals will continue to be obliged 
to implement UK statute law even when 
it is incompatible with the convention. 
Only the High Court may issue a 
certificate of incompatibility in such a 
case, leaving it to Parliament, should it
choose to do so, to pass amending 
legislation. An accelerated process is 
provided but it is left to the discretion of 
the relevant minister to choose to invoke 
it.
The convention is not part of 
community law, though the European 
Court of Justice has acknowledged thatJ o
its principles are of broad application and 
art. 5 of the Treaty of European Union 
(inserted by the Amsterdam Treaty) 
requires member states to respect the 
rights guaranteed by the convention. Of 
greater likely impact on anti- 
discrimination law is art. 13 of the 
Amsterdam Treaty which reads as 
follows:
'Without prejudice to the other provisions 
oj this Treaty and within the limits of the 
powers conferred by it upon the Community, 
the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposalJrom the Commission after consulting 
the European Parliament, may take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.'
The Amsterdam Treaty has not yet 
been ratified and ratification by all 
member states is unlikely to have been 
completed before 1999. Although the 
treaty will not come into force until then 
preparations are already under way to 
prepare community legislation in 
anticipation. That is likely to take the 
form of a directive which will set 
minimum standards for domestic 
legislation in the member states on 
discrimination. Article 13 of the 
Amsterdam Treaty covers areas of 
discrimination which are not touched on 
at all by current UK domestic law. 
Discrimination on grounds of sex, racial 
and ethnic origin, and disability are 
prohibited (to a greater or lesser degree) 
by the SDA, the RRA and the DDA but 
no legislation prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of religion or belief, age, or 
sexual orientation.
EUROPE WIDE STANDARDS
Article 13 provides an opportunity 
which has long been sought to establish
o O
standards for anti-discrimination laws 
throughout Europe. There is, of course, 
no compulsion on the community to act. 
There must be unanimity among the 
member states and the difficulties of 
establishing a consensus, especially on an 
issue which arouses religious and cultural 
conflicts, should not be underestimated.
The first stage in the process is a proposal 
from the commission upon which the 
European Parliament must be consulted. 
The directorate-general for research of
o
the Parliament has already produced a 
draft paper entitled Towards an EU anti- 
racist policy which indicates possible 
directions in which the matter may 
proceed and the informal group of 
experts calling itself 'the Starting Eine' 
has published a draft directive which it 
will invite the council to adopt. The 
Starting Eine's recently published 
pamphlet (Proposals jor Legislative Measures 
to Combat Racism and to Promote Equal 
Rights in the European Union edited by 
Isabelle Chopin and Jan Niessen 
(Commission for Racial Equality, 1998)) 
containing this draft argues that a council 
directive is the preferable form of 
community legislation. Its purpose is to 
set standards rather than to prescribe the 
precise content of national legislation. 
The alternative mechanism is a 
regulation. The legal systems and cultures 
of the member states differ widely and a 
regulation would be unduly prescriptive.
The draft directive covers 
discrimination on the grounds of both 
race and religion but does not touch on 
the other areas in art. 13. These raise 
separate questions which lead the 
drafters to consider that they should be 
dealt with in separate directives.
Broadly, the directive follows the 
pattern of UK domestic anti- 
discrimination legislation. It begins with 
a useful definition of racial and religious 
discrimination as:
'any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference which has the purpose or the effect 
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment, or exercise of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms or participation in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, religious 
life or any other public field on grounds of 
racial or ethnic origin or religion or belief.'
Direct and indirect discrimination are 
defined as in UK legislation but removing 
some weaknesses in the definition of 
indirect discrimination. Member states 
are required to take necessary measures 
in conformitv with their legal svstems to
^ O J
prohibit:
  discrimination of the kinds mentioned 
above;
  incitement or pressure to racial or 
religious discrimination by private 
individuals or bodies and by public
authorities and institutions; and
  the establishment, operation, 
membership or support of any 
organisation promoting such 
incitement.
Member states are required to provide 
effective judicial remedies and to 
establish bodies (like the Commission for 
Racial Equality (CRE) and Equal 
Opportunities Commission (EOC)) to 
investigate and pursue complaints.
These are of course merely the 
proposals of an independent group, 
albeit one which is highly respected 
within the community institutions. There 
is no certainty that these or any other 
progressive proposals will be accepted, 
especially bearing in mind the 
requirement of unanimity.
If a directive is adopted it will have 
more impact on other European states 
than on the UK whose legislation already 
complies with most of its provisions. 
Nevertheless it would bring about a 
significant strengthening of anti- 
discrimination law. It would of course 
extend the scope of the law to religious 
discrimination, but it would also extend 
the obligations of public authorities in 
relation to racial discrimination. They are 
exempted under current law in respect of 
many activities (see, for example, R v 
Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay, ex p Amin 
[1983] 2 AC 818). Further directives on 
disability, age and sexual orientation 
would also compel substantial extensions 
of UK anti-discrimination law.
There is, of course, no reason why the 
same extensions could not be achieved by 
domestic legislation. The Home Office is 
already reviewing the current law and is 
considering detailed and powerful 
recommendations recently submitted by 
the EOC and the CRE. It would be 
preferable to put our house in order now, 
in conformity- with our wider 
international obligations, rather than 
wait for European compulsion. ^
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